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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine whether legal systems affect the structure of capital markets in 
terms of the development of bond markets versus equity markets. Using a dataset of 42 
developed and developing countries, we document that a country's legal system, 
especially investor protections, determines the structure of the capital markets in a 
country. Our results indicate that in countries with stronger creditor rights, the bond 
markets are more developed than the equity markets. Alternatively, in countries with 
stronger shareholder rights, the equity markets are more developed than the bond 
markets. Additionally, we determine that the effects of financial reforms are strongly 
dependent on the strength of investor protections and information disclosure.  
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 1. Introduction 
In the last decade, the finance and law literatures have linked investor protection with 
the development and structure of the financial system. In a seminal paper, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, henceforth LLSV) indicated that 
legal rules and origins influence the protection of corporate shareholders and creditors 
and consequently may determine the development of the financial system within a 
country. Their results indicated also that the equity markets are more developed in 
countries with common law origins than with civil law origins. As a result, common law 
countries tend to have a market-based financial system, while civil law countries have a 
bank-based financial system. Additionally, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) found that 
countries with more legal protection for minority shareholders tend to have a more 
developed equity market. Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007, henceforth DMS), using 
cross-country data, documented a positive correlation between creditor rights and the size 
of credit markets. Finally, Modigliani and Perotti (2000), Ergungor (2004), Liberti and 
Mian (2010) provided evidence that legal institutions promote degree of financial system 
development or determine its structure.  
The existing evidence suggests that the mechanism through which law affects 
financial development is that investor protection cuts the cost of external financing and 
reduces financial constraints. Thus, countries with stronger legal institutions tend to have 
more developed financial systems and less financial constraints with lower interest rate 
spreads. Qian and Strahan (2007) examined the relationship between legal differences 
and terms of bank loans around the globe and argued that under strong creditor 
protection, loans have more concentrated ownership, longer maturities and lower interest 
rates. Haselmann et al. (2010) also investigated the effect of legal change on bank lending 
and found that banks increase the supply of credit subsequent to legal changes.  
In the literature, however, little attention has been paid so far to the determinants of 
the structure of the capital markets. In this paper, we examine how laws affect the 
structure of capital markets in terms of the development of the bond market relative to the 
equity market. Additionally, we investigate how financial reforms have had an impact on 
the associations between law and market finance in the past decades. Our analyses focus 
on three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that in countries with stronger creditor rights 
relative to shareholder rights, the bond markets are more developed relative to the equity 
markets. In line with the literature, we use market capitalization as a proxy for market 
development and the ratio of bond market capitalization to equity market capitalization as 
a proxy for the relative development of bond market to stock market. We test how the 
creditor rights and shareholder rights in one country impact on the development of the 
bond market and stock market. In formulating this, we assume that laws do not affect all 
market participants in the same manner, and legal origins matter for the financial 
development of different countries. Furthermore, we also assume that the economic 
development is correlated with the development of the legal system and financial system 
(LLSV 1997, 1998; DMS, 2007). More developed countries are more likely to encourage 
more functional legal systems, so that both creditor and shareholder power can be 
important in these countries, which is particularly important for financial system 
development. 
Our second hypothesis is that reforms of the financial system, especially those related 
to securities markets, enhance the development of bond markets in countries with 
stronger creditor rights, as well as equity markets in countries with stronger shareholder 
rights. Abiad et al. (2008) indicated that in the last decade, financial reforms in the 
securities market covered the policies to encourage development of these markets, such 
as tax incentives or the development of a depository and settlement system.  
Our third hypothesis is that better information disclosure improves the effectiveness 
of institutional reforms on the securities markets. We assume that in countries with better 
information disclosure, the effects of the reforms of the financial system should be more 
significant. In line with our second hypothesis, we expect that in countries with stronger 
creditor rights and better information disclosure, further institutional reforms in the 
securities market should improve significantly the development of the bond market. In 
formulating this hypothesis, we assume that the investor protection and information 
theories serve as substitution mechanisms for market development (Jappelli and Pagano, 
2002; DMS, 2007), that is, both ex ante or interim better information sharing and ex post 
stronger creditor rights or shareholder rights can contribute to the development of the 
bond market or equity market.  
We test these hypotheses using a sample of 42 developed and developing countries 
over a period from 1978 to 2011. We use several different measures as proxies for 
creditor protection and shareholder protection. In our study, we also control for other 
legal factors such as country legal origins, debt contract enforcement and bond contract 
covenant. The existing research indicates that theses legal factors are correlated with 
financial system development (LLSV, 1998; Nenova, 2006;  Djankovet al. 2007; DLLS, 
2008; Spamann, 2010). In addition, we investigate the impact of systemic financial crises 
on the relationship between law and capital market development and compare the results 
with these during normal periods (Allen et al., 2012). 
Our initial empirical strategy is to run cross-country regressions to investigate the 
relationships between the prevailing investor protections and the development of the 
structure of the capital market. Specifically, we examine how the legal variables such as 
common and civil law origins, debt contract enforcement, bond covenant and information 
disclosure vary with the composition of capital markets. In our tests, we also control for 
country macro-economic characteristics that are likely to impact the development of the 
capital markets, whereas we focus especially on the effects of creditor rights and 
shareholder rights on the development of the bond market relative to the equity market. 
Then, we also employ a natural experiment with a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff, 
henceforth) estimator to explore whether financial reforms in the past decades have any 
effect on the association between law and the development of the structure of the capital 
market within a country. This diff-in-diff strategy approach avoids the econometric 
concern that institutional factors such as creditor rights or shareholder rights are 
endogenous and presents an alternative to instrumental variable techniques that have been 
criticized by Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) and DMS (2007). 
 Based on our results, we can draw three main conclusions. First, consistent with 
our first hypothesis, the results indicate that countries with stronger creditor rights 
relative to shareholder rights tend to have a more developed bond market than equity 
market. As German civil law countries are more likely to have stronger creditor 
protection relative to shareholder rights, they tend to have a more developed bond market 
than English common law countries do. Moreover, the results indicate that restrictive 
bond covenants, which serve as an alternative ex-post mechanism to protect the 
bondholder, are for the most part negatively associated with the relative development of 
the bond market to the stock market. Additionally, we demonstrate that countries that 
have stronger debt contract enforcement have a more developed bond market than stock 
market, while, generally, information sharing is more helpful for equity market 
development.  
Second, in line with our second hypothesis, we find that financial reforms improve 
the development of the bond markets more than that of the equity markets in countries 
that had stronger creditor protections. In contrast, our result indicates that the reforms of 
the financial system in countries with stronger shareholder protections enhance the 
development of the stock market more than that of the bond market. The results indicate 
that the effect of financial reforms is strongly dependent on a country's legal system and 
the existing structure of its capital markets. For instance, in English common law 
countries, whereas the shareholder protection is on average stronger and the equity 
market is more developed, the financial reforms may play a more important role in 
further development of the equity market. Additionally, we document that greater 
information disclosure improves the effect of the financial reforms on the development of 
the capital market. 
Third, during crisis periods, the relationship between law and the structure of the 
capital market is not as significant as that during normal periods. We find that in many 
advanced economies, the bond market is developing faster than the stock market in the 
short term during a crisis period. Additionally, during a crisis period, we do not find 
significant evidence indicating that in countries with stronger creditor rights, the bond 
market is more developed than the equity market. Moreover, we find similar results for 
the emerging economies. Additionally, we assume that the financial crisis results in an 
increase in risk premiums in the stock markets, which leads to faster development of the 
bond market in the short term. Consequently, the observed association between the legal 
system and the structure of the capital market is partly offset during a crises period. 
Indeed, our results are in line with the findings of Allen et al. (2012), who documented 
significant short-term reversals in the development of the structures of the financial 
system during periods of financial crisis. However, they indicated that after a period, the 
financial system reverts to its previous structure. Henceforth, we also assume that after a 
financial crisis, the legal system determines to a large extent the structure of the capital 
market. 
Overall, our results document that legal factors are important in explaining the 
development of bond versus equity markets across countries. We document that in 
countries with stronger creditor rights relative to shareholder rights, the bond market is 
more developed than the stock market during normal periods. Moreover, we demonstrate 
that the effects of financial reforms on the development of the capital markets also 
depend on the legal system, especially the investor protections in the country. 
Nevertheless, we find that the relationship between the legal system and the structure of 
the capital market is less significant during crisis periods. We assume, however, that this 
change presents only a short-term reversal in the development of the structure of the 
capital markets. 
Our study is consistent with the results of Allen et al. (2012) on the structure of the 
financial system, crisis and reform, in which they demonstrated that the corporate bond 
market moves in the same direction with bank credit and experiences a short-term 
reversal with the stock market during a crisis. Our study, however, indicates the impact of 
crises on the structure of the capital markets, whereas they concentrated only on the 
structure of the financial system. Moreover, our study is in line with the findings of 
LLSV (1997), who indicated that investor protections are strongly correlated with stock 
market size. LLSV (2002) indicated that the valuation of firms is higher in countries with 
better protection of minority shareholders.  
Mclean, Zhang and Zhao (2012) indicated that investor protections promote share 
prices and reduce financial constraints. On the other hand, Roberts and Sufi (2009) found 
that the effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower's 
alternative sources of finance are costly and the incentive conflicts play an important role 
in shaping corporate finance policy. Acharya et al. (2011) indicated that stronger creditor 
rights are one way to mitigate stockholder expropriation, and they may also induce 
managers to reduce risk and to stifle even non-opportunistic risk taking that would be 
beneficial to all claimholders. Henceforth, stronger creditor protections may reduce firm 
financial leverage, which contradicts previous studies arguing that stronger creditor rights 
bring about a greater level of lending. In our study, we argue that stronger creditor rights 
may reduce firm risk-taking and negatively influence corporate valuation. As a result in 
countries with stronger creditor rights, the valuation for the equity market is lower and 
firms are more likely to finance their investment using the bond market. 
Our study contributes to the literature, as it fills an existing gap on the impact of the 
law on financial system development. In contrast to the previous studies, we use the bond 
market instead of private bank credit and hence provide new insights on the structure of 
the capital markets across countries. Additionally, we do not examine the absolute level 
of the bond market development, but we focus on the relative development of the bond 
market to the stock market. In general, English common law countries have more detailed 
creditor and shareholder laws and enforce laws more effectively than civil law countries. 
Thus, based on the existing research, the capital markets are more likely to be developed 
in common law countries. In contrast, bank-based financial systems are more likely to 
emerge as primary contract enforcers in civil law countries. Our argument is that 
compared to creditor protections, shareholder protections are in general stronger in 
common law countries. Hence, equity markets are more likely to develop in those 
countries than bond markets. However, in civil law countries, especially those of French 
civil law origin, the overall financial systems are less developed than in common law 
countries. However, in these countries, the bond markets are more developed than the 
equity markets, as the creditor protections are stronger. Our results are in contrast to 
Musacchio (2008), who employed data for Brazil from 1885 to 2003 and found no stable 
relationship between creditor protections and bond market development in the long run. 
However, in our study, we use a large dataset of countries and consequently the results 
are more general. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data. In 
Section 3, we present the methodology and the baseline model. Next, we show our main 
empirical results and the robustness test. In Section 4, we discuss the effect of financial 
reforms on the relationships between the legal system and capital markets. In Section 5, 
we discuss the evolvement of bond markets versus stock markets during systemic crises. 
Section 6 presents the paper’s conclusions. 
 2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our dataset is comprised of data for 42 developed and developing countries over the 
sample period of 1978 to 2011, whereas we use different data sources to collect the data. 
We use the revised financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2001, 2010, 2012, 2013) to 
construct the indicators of the development of the bond versus equity market. The legal 
variables that control for creditor rights and shareholder rights are from various sources 
including LLSV (1998), Nenova (2006), Djankov et al. (2007), DLLS (2008) and 
Spamann (2010). In the study, we also control for legal origins, bond covenant, 
information disclosure and debt contract enforcement, which may determine the way the 
legal system influences the development of the bond market versus stock market. 
Additionally, we also control for financial reform and systemic banking crises because 
they may influence firm decisions on bond financing or equity financing.  We use the 
data from Abiad and Mody (2005) and Abiad et al. (2008) for the set of control variables 
for financial reforms. In addition, we follow Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012) and refer 
to a systemic banking crisis when a country's corporate and financial sectors experience 
numerous defaults. Table 1 presents the descriptions for all the variables used in this 
study. 
 
2.1 Variable definitions 
2.1.1 Measures of bond market and equity market development 
As our main indicators, we employ variables for the bond market and equity market 
size to establish the structure of countries capital market. We follow the literature and use 
as a proxy of the size of the equity markets in the country the current value of listed 
shares divided by the GDP. Similarly, we use the bond market capitalization to GDP as a 
measure of the size of the bond markets. Next, we construct our first dependent variable 
Structure_1, which is the ratio of bond market capitalization to equity market 
capitalization, as an indicator of the structure of the capital markets in the country. 
The bond market capitalization, however, includes the present value of both private 
and public bond securities. Henceforth, we use a second dependent variable Structure_2, 
which includes only the ratio of private bond market capitalization to equity market 
capitalization. 
 
2.1.2 Measures of legal determinants 
In our study, we focus on how two dimensions of the legal systems determine the 
structure of capital markets, namely, creditor protection and shareholder protection. 
However, in the regressions, we also control for country legal origins, bond covenants, 
debt contract enforcement and information disclosure.  
We use the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) as a measure of legal rights 
of creditors in the countries in our study. The index, ranging from zero (weak creditor 
rights) to four (strong creditor rights), measures the number of laws and regulations that 
limit expropriation from secured lenders in a country. This index has been used as a 
measure of creditor power and has been demonstrated to be remarkably stable over time. 
As noted by Miller and Reisel (2012), the index not only matters to secured lenders but is 
relevant in interpreting patterns of the capital market. Therefore, in our study, we use the 
creditor rights index as a main proxy for country-level bondholder protection. 
It should be noted that creditor rights are an ex-post mechanism, which protects 
bondholders upon firm defaults. We therefore control also for restrictive covenants, 
which limit the actions of the managers prior to defaults and serve as the ex-ante 
mechanisms to protect investors. Miller and Reisel (2012) argued that bond contracts are 
more likely to include restrictive covenants in countries with weak creditor protection. 
Henceforth, bond covenants are an alternative mechanism to protect investors at the 
country level. In the study, we employ the average number of bond covenants from the 
Yankee Bond Market (Miller and Reisel, 2012) as a proxy for bond covenants, which 
ranges from zero (low covenant intensity) to thirteen (high covenant intensity). The proxy 
reflects three major categories of covenants: restrictions on financing activities, 
restrictions on investment activities and restrictions on payouts.   
In addition to laws on the books, the quality of law enforcement is also likely to 
determine the structure of the capital markets. Consequently, we also control for law 
enforcement with a measure of the number of days it takes to enforce a debt contract. 
DHMS (2008) documented that the efficiency of debt enforcement are economically and 
statistically significant predictors of the development of debt markets across countries.  
Similarly, we control for shareholder protection using three different proxies: anti-
director rights, anti-self-dealing and anti-takeover provisions. The index of anti-director 
rights (ADR) introduced by LLSV (1998) aggregates six dimensions of shareholder 
protection rules. Of the six components, three are concerned with shareholder voting, 
including voting by mail, voting without blocking of shares and calling an extraordinary 
meeting; and the others are concerned with minority protection including proportional 
board representation, preemptive rights and judicial remedies. The index, however, has 
been criticized for its ad hoc nature, for mistakes in coding and the conceptual ambiguity 
in the definitions of some of its components (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Spamann, 2010). 
Thus, DLLS (2008) provided a revised version of the ADR index, which was 
conceptually continuous with the original one but more clearly defined and more reliably 
weighted for 72 countries. The results indicated that the correlation between the original 
and revised ADR was only 0.60. However, some issues such as ambiguous definitions 
still remain in the revised ADR index. Hence, Spamann (2010), using the legal data for 
forty-six countries and improved coding with leading local lawyers involved in the 
research questionnaires, provided a corrected ADR index. The corrected ADR index 
differs substantially from the original (ρ=0.53) and from the revised index (ρ=0.67). 
Furthermore, Spamann (2010) also demonstrated that many empirical results established 
using the original index cannot be replicable with corrected values. In particular, the 
corrected value fails to support some widely influential claims such as that shareholder 
protection is higher in the common law countries than in civil law countries. Thus, in this 
study, we employ both the revised ADR index from DLLS (2008) and the corrected ADR 
index from Spamann (2010) to control for its potential limitations. 
The index of shareholder rights focuses on anti-self-dealing and tunneling. DLLS 
(2008) presented a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders based on answers to a questionnaire distributed to 102 
law firms from 72 countries, named the anti-self-dealing index. The index covers both 
ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms that can limit anti-self-dealing transactions, including 
the disclosure and approval by minority shareholders, independent review and standing to 
sue. While both the ADR index and anti-self-dealing index capture the strength of 
shareholder rights, there are still significant differences between them, which may lead to 
different interpretations of the results of our study. DLLS (2008) indicated that anti-
director rights compared to self-dealing is the central problem of corporate governance in 
many countries in recent years. Thus, they suggested that, in general, anti-self-dealing is 
preferable to the ADR index in cross-county studies. Additionally, the empirical evidence 
indicates that the anti-self-dealing index is a more robust predictor of stock market 
development than the ADR index. 
Finally, we also employ the anti-takeover index, which captures the set of rules and 
regulations concerned with changes in corporate control, takeovers, tender offers and 
general acquisition activity across countries (Nenova, 2006). The strict takeover laws 
have benefits for minority shareholders by helping them share some of the value released 
during acquisitions (Gompers et al., 2003). On the other hand, they have a negative effect 
on the private benefits of the controlling corporate owner, which is especially significant 
for emerging economies where other mechanisms of protecting minority shareholders are 
limited. Nenova (2006) also indicated that the takeover laws affect the depth of capital 
markets and are robust to the general level of national economic growth.  
A country's legal origin has been demonstrated to be an important determinant of both 
creditor rights and shareholder rights in a number of studies (LLSV, 1997, 1998; Levine, 
1999; Beck et al. 2003a, 2003b; DLLS, 2008, Spamann, 2010). Following LLSV (1997, 
1998), we identify four main legal origins: English, French, German and Scandinavian. 
The dummy variable L_English equals one if the country has the legal origin of English 
common law. The dummy for countries with French (L_French) and German civil law 
origin (L_German) are constructed in an identical manner as with the English common 
law legal origin dummy. However, the few countries with Scandinavian civil law origin 
(L_Scandinavian) are captured in the regressions by the constant. LLSV (1997, 1998) 
indicated that the original ADR index is on average statistically significantly higher for 
the common law countries than for the civil law countries both as a whole and within 
each of the three sub-families, French civil law countries, German civil law countries and 
Scandinavian civil law countries. DLLS (2008) noted that, consistent with the original 
index, the revised ADR index also exhibits sharply higher value in common law countries 
than in French civil law countries. The existing research indicates also that the legal 
origin also matters for creditor rights. LLSV (1998) found that common law countries 
offer creditor stronger legal protections against managers, while the French civil law 
countries provide creditors the weakest protections. This is also consistent with the 
findings of Djankov et al. (2007), who investigated legal creditor rights in 129 countries.  
Better information disclosure can be both ex-ante and interim mechanism, which can 
contribute to credit market development (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). La Porta et al. 
(2006) documented that information disclosure can especially benefit the public 
bondholders. Thus, in this study, we also control for the index of information disclosure 
released by the Center for Financial Analysis and Research's (CIFAR) International 
Accounting and Auditing Trends. CIFAR created an index aggregating 90 items such as 
general information, income statements, balance sheets, etc. by examining and rating the 
annual reports of approximately 1,000 industrial companies across countries. This index 
has been used by a number of papers (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Bushman et al. 2004). 
[Table 1] 
2.1.3 Definitions of banking crisis 
In a systemic banking crisis, non-performing loans increase dramatically and much of 
the aggregate banking system capital is shortly exhausted. As a result, a systematic 
banking crisis always leads to output losses in the economy. In this paper, we use the 
starting dates of systemic banking crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2012). 
However, we focus only on those banking crises with an output loss of over 10% as we 
assume that only a large banking crisis might lead to significant changes in the structure 
characteristics of financial systems regarding the bond market and stock market. Based 
on the criteria and using the database of Laeven and Valencia (2012), we are able to 
identify 144 systemic banking crises across countries from 1970 to 2011. 
 
2.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the contemporaneous correlations for all 
the variables used in the following regression analysis. For all the variables, the dataset 
covers 42 countries from 1978 to 2011. The results in Table 2 indicate a large variation 
between bond market development and stock market development across countries.  
The variable Structure_1 exhibits high cross-sectional variability ranging from 0.01 
to 9.52 with a mean of 1.44, which indicates that compared to stock market development, 
there are huge differences with bond market development across countries. The variable 
Structure_2, which is defined as the development of the private bond market versus the 
stock market also exhibits high variability, ranging from 0.00 to 5.68 with a mean of 
0.58. For example, the averages of the last five years (2007-2011) for Italy, the Slovak 
Republic, Iceland, Austria and Ireland have the highest ratio of bond market 
capitalization to stock market capitalization. In contrast, the lowest ratios of bond market 
capitalization to stock market capitalization are those of Chile, Switzerland, South Africa, 
Hong Kong and Luxembourg. If we remove the public bond market, Iceland, Ireland, 
Denmark, Austria and Italy have the highest ratio of bond market capitalization to stock 
market capitalization in the last five years, while Hong Kong, Philippine, Luxembourg, 
Columbia and Turkey have the lowest ratio of bond market capitalization to stock market 
capitalization. Taking the US as an example, the value of the total bond market to stock 
market is 1.56, and the value of the private bond market to the stock market is 0.89. The 
creditor rights index ranges from 0 to 4 with an average of 1.80, which indicates that 
there are more countries around the globe with lower creditor rights. The revised ADR 
index and corrected ADR index range from 1 to 5 and 2 to 6 with an average of 3.37 and 
3.74, respectively. The anti-self-dealing index has an average of 0.44, and its scores are 
from 0.08 to 1.00. The anti-takeover index has an average of 0.46, and the scores are 
from 0.04 to 0.97. 
The statistics in Table 2 indicate that the two variables of the development of the 
bond market versus stock market are highly correlated with a correlation of 0.79. The 
creditor rights exhibit both significant and positive associations with Structure_2 but are 
positive and insignificant with Structure_1. In addition to the anti-takeover index, the 
other variables of shareholder rights are all significantly and negatively correlated to both 
Structure_1 and Structure_2. These are consistent with our hypothesis that stronger 
creditor rights are positively associated with higher development of the bond market 
relative to the stock market, while stronger shareholder rights should have a negative 
impact on the development of the bond market versus the stock market.  
Table 2 also indicates positive correlation between creditor rights and shareholder 
rights. The prior evidence from the US firms, for instance, Cremers et al. (2007) and 
Chava et al. (2009), emphasized the shareholder/ bondholder conflicts, as strong 
shareholder rights will be negative to bondholders by increasing the likelihood of wealth 
transfers to shareholders. However, recently, more research from the international 
evidence, for instance, Johnson et al. (2000) and Djankov et al. (2008), demonstrated that 
strong minority shareholder rights can prevent the expropriation of assets from all 
stakeholders, which can alleviate the conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. 
The English legal origin is significantly positively associated with both the creditor rights 
and shareholder rights, while the French legal origin exhibits completely opposite 
correlations. The German legal origin indicates significantly positive correlations with 
creditor rights but mixed associations with shareholder rights.   
The bond covenant exhibits significantly negative associations with both Structure_1 
and Structure_2 and also exhibits significantly negative correlations with creditor rights, 
which is also consistent with our assumption that bond covenants should exhibit as an 
alternative way to protect the creditor rights. The association between bond covenants 
and shareholder rights are quite mixed. Johnson et al. (2000) and Djankov et al. (2008) 
also presented ambiguous results on this issue. As we have mentioned, prior evidence 
from the U.S. firms indicates that strong shareholder rights may harm bondholders; thus, 
it should be supplemented by high bond covenant intensity to protect bondholders. 
However, recent papers based on cross-country evidence suggest that strong minority 
shareholder rights will ease the conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. The 
variable of information disclosure exhibits positive correlation with both credit rights and 
shareholder rights, and the variable of the time it takes to enforce a debt contract exhibits 
negative associations with both rights. 
[Table 2] 
3. Methodology and Results 
3.1 Baseline model 
We use different methods in this study to assess the impact of law on the 
development of the bond market versus equity market. First, we begin by employing 
random effects estimates using generalized least squares (GLS) to explore the influence 
of creditor rights and shareholder rights on the structure of market-financing: 
 
஻௢௡ௗ	௠௔௥௞௘௧	௖௔௣.೟.
ௌ௧௢௖௞	௠௔௥௞௘௧	௖௔௣.೟ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧   (1) 
 
where i indexes countries, t indexes years, and the ratio of bond market capitalization to 
stock market capitalization is the dependent variable of interest, which evaluates the 
development of the bond market versus stock market. The variables ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ are country 
and year fixed effects, and ௜ܺ,௧ denotes the set of control variables, which include legal 
origins, bond covenants, information disclosure and variables of macroeconomic 
environment such as log of GDP, log of GDP per capita and inflation. ߝ௜,௧ is an error 
term. Random effects estimates are more efficient than pooled OLS estimates and assume 
that country effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, while fixed effects allow country 
effects to be correlated with regressors. Thus, we examine by fitting both FE and RE 
models if possible. As the variable Revised ADR index and Anti-self-dealing index do not 
vary over time, we do not include these two variables into the FE model, as time-
invariant measures have no explanatory power in the FE framework.  
 
3.2 Random Effects Estimates 
In this section, we present the main results from our baseline model. We regress the 
dependent variable on the creditor rights index and each of the variables of shareholder 
rights. 
Table 3 indicates that the coefficient for creditor rights is significant and positively 
correlated to the relative development of the bond market to equity market in all the 
specifications. Additionally, the coefficients for the different variables reflecting 
shareholder rights are significant and have a negative sign in many of the specifications 
Only the coefficient for the variable Anti-takeover does not enter with a statistically 
significant sign in the regressions. We find that both the revised ADR and the corrected 
ADR enter with significant and negative signs at least at the 5% level. In terms of 
economic magnitude, a 1% increase in the score of the creditor rights will bring a 0.27% 
increase in the relative level of development of the bond market relative to the equity 
market. In contrast, a 1% decrease in the score of the revised ADR results in the relative 
decline of the level of bond market to stock market by 0.54%, and the situation is similar 
with both the anti-self-dealing index and the corrected ADR index.  
In the regressions, we also control for other macroeconomic variables employing log 
of GDP, log of GDP per capita and inflation. The exogenous macroeconomic situations 
of the country may determine the growth of the bond market and stock market. Including 
the additional control variables does not change our basic results. In the specification (5)-
(8), the creditor rights and shareholder rights remain positively and negatively associated, 
respectively, with the relative growth of the bond market versus the equity market. In 
addition, we also find that the GDP level is significantly and negatively correlated with 
the relative level of the bond market to stock market development, indicating that 
countries with higher GDP volume are more likely to have a more developed stock 
market relative to the bond market.  
[Table 3] 
Table 4 displays the results, for which we add proxies for country legal origins into 
the specifications. Adding additional control variables does not change the results 
presented in Table 3. The new results confirm that creditor rights and shareholder rights 
affect the relative development of the bond market to the equity market. We find that the 
English common law countries tend to have a more developed stock market, whereas the 
coefficient for English origin is negative and significant only in specification (2). In 
contrast, our results indicate that the German civil law countries tend to have a more 
developed bond market.  However, the coefficient for German law is positive and 
insignificant. This is consistent with the previous research indicating that common law 
countries are more likely to have stronger shareholder rights than the civil law countries 
in general (LLSV, 1997, 1998). Ergungor (2004) documented also that countries with 
civil law are more likely to have a bank-oriented financial system than common law 
countries. Our results add to the existing research by indicating that the legal origins may 
determine the structure of the capital markets. We find weak evidence that German civil 
law countries tend to have more developed bond markets relative to stock markets than 
do the English common law countries.  
[Table 4] 
Next, we add variables that control for the restrictive bond covenant. Bond covenants 
may serve as an alternative ex-post mechanism to protect bondholders. The results in 
Table 5 indicate that the bond covenants are for the most part negatively associated with 
the relative development of the bond market to the equity market. This is consistent with 
the results in Table 3 and 4, as countries that have a more developed bond market tend to 
have stronger creditor protection; thus, they are less likely to include restrictive bond 
covenants in bond contracts.  
Additionally, we control also for information disclosure and log of days of debt 
contract enforcement in the regressions. Adding these two control variables does not 
change our main results presenting the impact of creditor rights and shareholder rights on 
the structure and development of the capital markets.  The results indicate that countries 
that have better information disclosure mechanisms have more developed equity instead 
of bond markets. The coefficient for information disclosure is negative and significant in 
many of the specifications. In contrast, we find that countries with better debt contract 
enforcement have a more developed bond market.  The coefficient for log of days of debt 
contract enforcement is positive and significant only in the last specification.  
In sum, the results confirm the impact of legal determinants on the development of 
the structure of the capital market, and they indicate that countries with stronger creditor 
rights and weaker shareholder rights are more likely to have a more developed bond 
market relative to an equity market.  We find weak evidence that countries with German 
civil law, which are more likely to have stronger creditor protection, tend to have more 
developed bond markets than do English common law countries. Improvements in 
information disclosure helps to develop equity markets more, while stronger bond 
contract enforcement is more helpful in developing bond markets.      
[Table 4] 
3.3 Robustness 
To check the robustness of our main results presented in Table 3, we exclude the 
public bond market and use the ratio of private bond market capitalization to equity 
market capitalization as the dependent variable. We present the results in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix.  
The change in the construction of the dependent variable does not alter our main 
results. The results confirm that countries with stronger creditor protection tend to have 
more developed private bond markets relative to equity markets. In contrast, countries 
with stronger shareholder protection tend to have more developed stock markets.  
When we add more legal determinants to our baseline model, the results are 
consistent with the results in Table 4. We find that the coefficient for bond covenant 
remains significant and are negatively associated with the development of the bond 
market. Similarly, the coefficient for the proxy for debt contract enforcement, as an ex-
post mechanism to protect bondholders, is again negatively related to bond market 
development. Finally, the results indicate again that information disclosure is negatively 
correlated with the relative development of the bond market to the stock market.  
 
4. Financial Reform, Law and Development of the Bond versus Stock Market 
To investigate the impact of financial reforms on the relationship between legal 
determinants and the development of the structure of the capital market, we apply a 
natural experiment using a diff-in-diff estimator.  This methodology basically compares 
the effect of an event (a financial policy-change in our setting) on groups more affected 
by the policy changes (namely, the treated group) with those that are less affected by the 
changes (namely, the control group). In our setting, we assume that the development of 
the bond market versus equity market of the countries with a higher ratio of creditor 
rights to shareholder rights should be more affected by financial reforms. Thus, we use 
the ratio of the creditor rights to shareholder rights of pretreatment to classify countries 
into treated (the top 33% of the whole sample) and control groups (the bottom 33% of the 
whole sample).  We test the following specification: 
ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.௧
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.௧
ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߪ ∙ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݁݀ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ_ݎ݂݁݋ݎ݉ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧
൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧	
                                                 (2) 
where treated=1 if unit is in treated group and equals zero otherwise; Post_reform is the 
lag term of the dummy of reform; thus, it denotes the year after financial reforms and 
equals zero otherwise. Both the dummy of reform and the financial reform index are from 
the IMF Financial Reform Database. The financial reform index, ranging from zero to 
twenty-one, is a sum of seven different dimensions of financial sector policy, including 
credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry 
barriers, state ownership in banking sector, capital account restrictions, prudential 
regulations and supervision of the banking sector and securities market policy. For each 
dimension, a country is given a score graded from zero (high repression) to three (full 
liberalization). The values of the index are quite stable for the majority of normal years 
but are changing if there are reforms in the financial sector. Not all of the seven 
dimensions have a direct influence on the development of the capital market. 
Additionally, we assume that some of the reforms may affect both the bond market and 
equity market. The regulation and supervision of the banking sector may affect the capital 
market environment and the firm financing decision on bond issuing or equity issuing.  
The dummy of reform is defined as follows. It equals one if the first-difference of the 
financial reform index is greater than zero, and otherwise, it equals zero. Thus, it stands 
for the year when there are financial policy changes. Hence, the lag term of the reform 
dummy (Post_reform) represents the first year after the financial reforms. We do not add 
the dummy Post_reform as an independent variable separately as it will be collinear with 
the year fixed-effects. Hence, the estimates on Post_reform separately will be just random 
intercepts with no meanings. The diff-in-diff effect is captured by σ. 
Table 6 reports the effects of financial reform on the association between law and 
capital market structure development employing the diff-in-diff strategy. We examine our 
hypotheses by fitting both fixed-effects and random models and then compare their 
estimates. First, adding a diff-in-diff estimator does not change the main results presented 
in Table 3. The relationship between creditor rights, shareholder rights and market 
development remains statistically significant and the sign of the coefficients does not 
change. Second, the effects of financial reforms are all statistically significant in the 
specifications. We find that the financial reforms do improve the development of the 
bond market more than that of the stock market in countries with stronger credit 
protections relative to shareholder protections. This indicates that financial reforms 
promote the development of the bond market if the countries have stronger creditor 
rights. Third, we also add the interaction term between information disclosure and 
financial reform. The results indicate that in countries with better information disclosure, 
the effects of financial reforms are more efficient and significant.   
[Table 6] 
In the regressions, we have treated countries with a higher ratio of the creditor rights 
index to shareholder rights index as the treated group and countries with a lower ratio as 
the control group. Next, we further test the robustness by adding the interaction terms 
between the legal variables and the Post_reform dummy. As indicated by Table 7, after 
financial reforms, the relations between legal determinants and market development do 
not change: Stronger creditor rights are still significantly helpful for improving bond 
market development, and stronger shareholder protection is good for equity market 
development. However, the significance for the impact of shareholder protections is now 
lower, especially for both the revised ADR and the corrected ADR.   
[Table 7] 
One explanation is that there may still exist cross-sectional heterogeneity among 
countries, such as the information disclosure system or other related regulatory and 
supervisory factors. Thus, it is natural to expect that for countries with better information 
disclosure, the effects of financial reform may be more significant. Hence, we interact the 
treatment dummy (Post_reform dummy) with the variable for information disclosure. The 
results in Table 7 confirm our hypothesis that the financial reforms will be more effective 
in countries with better information sharing; however, the results are again for countries 
with strong creditor rights rather than shareholder rights. This is reasonable, as the 
information disclosure index that we are using is more focused on bondholder benefits3. 
                                                            
3 Similarly with Miller and Reisel (2012), in this paper, we use the index of information disclosure from 
Bushman et al. (2004), which is aggregated from disclosure practice and enforcement of accounting 
The results are also consistent with Sorge and Zhang (2014), who document that the ex-
ante better credit information acts as a substitute for ex-post stronger creditor protection, 
especially in less developed countries. La Porta et al. (2006) also argue that the 
availability of corporate disclosure would likely be important to public bondholders.  
[Table 7] 
5. Development of the Bond Market versus Stock Market during Crises 
Finally, we investigate how the bond market and equity market respond to systemic 
banking crises. The crises can be considered relatively exogenous shocks; however, they 
obviously do not dramatically change the creditor and shareholder protection 
environment in countries that experience crises in those short periods. On the other hand, 
Johnson et al. (2000) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) have argued that as the expected 
investment return fell during crisis, the incentives for preventing the shareholder from 
transferring wealth from other stakeholders increased. Thus, during crises periods when 
the economic growth outlook deteriorates, the legal determinants such as rights for 
creditors and shareholders, debt contract enforcement and bond covenants should play 
more important roles.  
Therefore, if creditor and shareholder rights affect the relative development of bond 
market and stock market, one would expect that the structure of the capital market should 
switch more to stock market in countries with stronger shareholder rights, or switch more 
to the bond market in countries with stronger creditor rights. However, we assume that it 
should also be dependent on the development of the bond market or stock market itself. 
In most developing economies, for instance, bond market development is still at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
standards and thus is more relevant to bondholders. There are also several other indexes of disclosure, such 
as those contained in La Porta et al. (2006), which focus more on shareholder benefits.  
initial stage, and firm financing is more reliant on the equity market or bank lending. 
Thus, even creditor protection is stronger than shareholder protection4, and it is not likely 
that the bond market will experience fast development during short periods of crises.  
We test the assumption including the dummy of banking crises and interact it with the 
variables proxying for legal rights. Moreover, we first test use the whole sample and then 
split the sample into the sub-groups of advanced economies, namely, the East Asian 
economies and Latin American economies. Table 9 presents the results for which we use 
in the regression the full sample of countries. The results in columns (1), (3) and (5) 
indicate that crises exhibit significant and positive association with bond market 
development relative to stock market development. Table 9 indicates that stock market 
capitalization declines during the crisis period, which we attribute to deterioration of 
economic growth as well as company future profits. At the same time, we find that the 
bond market capitalization increases relative to the equity market. 
During normal times, the relation between the development of the bond market versus 
the stock market and legal rights are still significant in these specifications, while we find 
that during crises, the sensitivity of the interactions between legal rights and relative 
capitalization of the bond market and stock market is not significant. This may be related 
to the fact that during the period, the full sample covers the years from 1978 to 2011. In 
this period, there were more crises in emerging market economies than advanced 
economies, which have less developed financial systems, particularly the capital markets. 
[Table 9] 
To examine the effects of the crises further, we collect three sub-groups from our 
                                                            
4 As the creditor rights are also positively associated with bank lending, the emerging economies that we 
assume here may have more dominant banking systems than the stock market. 
sample: advanced economies with GDP per capita over 10,000 USD, East Asian 
economies and Latin American economies. For advanced economies, many of them have 
more developed bond markets than emerging markets and developing countries do. For 
East Asian economies, seven of them experienced severe crises from 1997 to 1998. Thus, 
our subsample for this group covers: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, 
Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore, which is consistent with Johnson et al. (2000), 
Mitton (2002) and Bae and Goyal (2009). However, we exclude Taiwan, as we are 
missing control variables for Taiwan. We also collect a sub-group for Latin American 
economies as they had higher frequency of crises in the past decades. Instead of using the 
dummy of banking crisis separately, we use the interaction term between region indicator 
and banking crisis dummy in this specification.  
Table 10 presents the results with these sub-groups. First, the effects of crises on the 
relative development of bond markets to stock markets are more significant for advanced 
economies than for both East Asian economies and Latin American economies. As we 
have mentioned, during the East Asian crises, the bond market in many of these 
economies is much less developed than the stock market. The average ratio of bond 
market capitalization to stock market capitalization in this group is 0.63, much lower than 
the mean value for the whole sample 1.44 and even much lower than the mean value for 
the sub-sample of the advanced economies 2.05. It is the similar case with the sub-group 
of Latin American economies, which has an average ratio of 0.86. However, in the long 
run, the bond market is growing in these emerging areas with the development of both the 
economic and financial system. Therefore, the effects of the banking crises may last for a 
very short period or could also be insignificant and partly offset by the long-run 
economic growth trend.  
[Table 10] 
The relationship is presented in Figure 1. In the sub-groups of East Asia and Latin 
America, the economies experienced very short-term faster growth in the bond market 
relative to the stock market during the crises from 1970 to 2011. The bond market, 
however, returned to the growth trend soon after the crises. Second, for the advanced 
economies, there is consistent evidence for our hypotheses that for countries with 
stronger creditor rights, during crises, the bond market will experience faster 
development than the stock market, although the effect is less significant than in normal 
periods, while for East Asian economies and Latin American economies, the effects are 
quite mixed.   
[Figure 1] 
6. Conclusions 
In the study, we examine whether the law affects the structure of market finance in 
terms of the development of the bond market versus stock market using a dataset of 42 
developed and developing countries from 1978 to 2011. Our results indicate that a 
country's legal system, especially investor protections, determines the structure of the 
capital market. We find that in countries with stronger creditor rights, the bond markets 
are more developed than the equity markets. In contrast, the existing shareholder rights 
positively influence the development of the equity market.  
Moreover, our results indicate that financial reforms improve the development of the 
bond market more than that of the equity market in countries with stronger creditor 
protections. In our opinion, these results indicate how laws affect the capital market 
development and present an explanation for why some countries have a more developed 
bond market relative to the equity market. Additionally, we find that the relationship 
between law and capital market development is less significant during a crises period. 
This paper fills the existing gap in the literature of the relationship between law and 
bond market development, as the existing literature focused mainly on bank and equity 
finance. Stronger creditor rights mitigate stockholder expropriation and in the meanwhile 
reduce corporate risk taking and have a negative impact on corporate valuation as well. 
Thus, one explanation for the relationship between the law and the bond market is that for 
countries with stronger creditor rights, firms may be more willing to obtain financing 
through the bond market with the valuation of the equity market lower. However, in this 
paper, we did not discuss the tradeoff between improvement of creditor rights and 
shareholder rights. It would be interesting to investigate the optimal structure of the 
country capital markets related to long-term economic growth, as well as the tradeoffs 
between creditor and shareholder protections; however, we leave this subject for further 
research. 
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Table 1 
Definitions of the main variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Financial Structure
Bond market 
capitalization 
Private and public bond market  
capitalization divided by GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beck et al. (2001, 2010); 
Cihak, M. et al. (2012) 
Private bond market  Private bond market capitalization 
divided by GDP 
Equity market 
capitalization 
Equals stock market capitalization 
divided by GDP 
Structure_1 The ratio of bond market 
capitalization to stock market 
capitalization 
Structure_2 The ratio of private bond market 
capitalization to stock market 
capitalization 
Law 
Creditor rights index An index aggregating creditor 
rights. The index ranges from 0 
(weakest creditor rights) to 4 
(strongest creditor rights) 
Djankov, S. et al. (2007) 
Revised anti-director 
rights index (Revised 
ADRI) 
A revised index of the original 
anti-director rights index, which 
aggregates shareholder protection 
in over a hundred articles, 
including shareholder voting and 
minority protection 
LLSV (1998) 
DLLS (2008) 
Corrected anti-director 
rights index (Corrected 
ADRI) 
A further corrected index of the 
original anti-director rights index, 
with improved data collection, 
coding and documentation 
Spamann (2010) 
Anti-self-dealing index An index summarizing the 
strength of minority shareholders 
in limiting expropriation by 
corporate insiders 
DLLS (2008) 
Antitakeover provisions An index measuring the extent of 
anti-takeover regulations across 
countries 
Nenova (2006) 
Bond covenant  An index aggregating 
heterogeneous rights attached to 
bonds 
Miller. D. and N. Reisel. 
(2012) 
Information disclosure  An index created by examining 
and rating companies' annual 
reports on their inclusion or 
omission on 90 items with a 
higher number indicating more 
International Accounting 
and Auditing Trends, 
Center for Financial 
Analysis and Research 
(CIFAR); 
disclosure. These items include: 
general information, income 
statements, balance sheets, funds 
flow statement, etc. At least three 
companies in one country were 
studied 
 
Debt enforcement Equals the logarithm of the 
number of days to resolve a 
payment dispute through courts  
Djankov, S. (2008) 
Financial Reforms 
Financial reforms index An index of financial reforms, 
normalized to be between 0 and 1. 
 
 
Abiad et al. (2008) Reform Dummy=1 if the 1st difference 
term of financial reform index 
higher than 0 
Crises 
Systemic banking crises Represents a banking crisis when 
a country's corporate and financial 
sectors experience numerous 
defaults 
Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) 
Macroeconomic control variables 
Log of GDP  Logarithm of gross national 
product (current US dollars) 
World Development 
Indicators (2013) 
Log of GDP per capita Logarithm of gross national 
product per capita 
World Development 
Indicators (2013) 
Inflation Annual growth rate of consumer 
price index 
World Development 
Indicators (2013) 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Structure_1 Structure_2 Creditor 
rights 
Revised 
ADR 
Corrected 
ADR 
Anti-self-
dealing 
Antitakeover L_English L_French L_German Bond 
covenant 
Information 
disclosure 
Log of days of 
contract 
enforcement 
Financial 
reform 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 1.44 0.58 1.80 3.37 3.74 0.44 0.46 0.27 0.48 0.13 2.50 71.62 5.79 0.49 
Std. Dev. 1.45 0.75 1.18 1.13 0.95 0.23 0.24 0.45 0.50 0.33 2.38 8.07 0.65 0.30 
Min. 0.01 0.00 0 1 2 0.08 0.04 0 0 0 0 56 3.30 0 
Max. 9.52 5.68 4 5 6 1 0.97 1 1 1 7 85 7.29 1 
Obs. 856 856 4,080 3,692 2,340 3,692 2,496 6,812 6,812 6,812 2,444 1,924 6,708 2,539 
Panel B: Correlations 
Structure_1 
 1              
Structure_2 0.79* 
(0.00) 1             
Creditor rights 0.01 
(0.77) 
0.15* 
(0.00) 1            
Revised ADR -0.29* 
(0.00) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
0.20* 
(0.00) 1           
Corrected ADR -0.22* 
(0.00) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
0.69* 
(0.00) 1          
Anti-self-dealing -0.33* 
(0.00) 
-0.24* 
(0.00) 
0.30* 
(0.00) 
0.56* 
(0.00) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 1         
Antitakeover -0.07 
(0.07) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.34* 
(0.00) 
0.49* 
(0.00) 
0.37* 
(0.00) 
0.51* 
(0.00) 1        
L_English -0.32* 
(0.00 
-0.22* 
(0.00) 
0.30* 
(0.00) 
0.48* 
(0.00) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
0.60* 
(0.00) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 1       
L_French 0.10* 
(0.00) 
-0.12* 
(0.00) 
-0.41* 
(0.00) 
-0.38* 
(0.00) 
-0.28* 
(0.00) 
-0.39* 
(0.00) 
-0.41* 
(0.00) 
-0.59* 
(0.00) 1      
L_German 0.16* 
(0.00) 
0.14* 
(0.00) 
0.15* 
(0.00) 
-0.15* 
(0.00) 
0.12* 
(0.00) 
-0.15* 
(0.00) 
0.19* 
(0.00) 
-0.24* 
(0.00) 
-0.37* 
(0.00) 1     
Bond covenant -0.29* 
(0.00) 
-0.39* 
(0.00) 
-0.27* 
(0.00) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.23* 
(0.00) 
0.20* 
(0.00) 
-0.24* 
(0.00) 
0.21* 
(0.00) 
0.15* 
(0.00) 
-0.27* 
(0.00) 1    
Information 
disclosure 
-0.25* 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.79) 
0.26* 
(0.00) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 
0.16* 
(0.00) 
0.46* 
(0.00) 
0.66* 
(0.00) 
0.38* 
(0.00) 
-0.53* 
(0.00) 
-0.10* 
(0.00) 
-0.25* 
(0.00) 1   
Log of days of 
contract 
enforcement 
0.05 
(0.13) 
-0.20* 
(0.00) 
-0.15* 
(0.0) 
-0.24* 
(0.00) 
-0.34* 
(0.00) 
-0.16* 
(0.00) 
-0.38* 
(0.00) 
-0.12* 
(0.00) 
0.23* 
(0.00) 
-0.05* 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.35* 
(0.0) 1  
Financial reform 0.02 
(0.73) 
0.15* 
(0.00) 
0.10* 
(0.00) 
0.07* 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.88) 
0.09* 
(0.00) 
0.32* 
(0.00) 
-0.05* 
(0.01) 
-0.13* 
(0.00) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
-0.23* 
(0.00) 
0.38* 
(0.00) 
-0.25* 
(0.00) 1 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively 
 
  
Table 3   
Main results: Creditor rights, shareholder rights and bond vs. stock market development 
This table reports results for the regression ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌. ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.ൗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧.  The dependent variable is the relative capitalization of bond market to stock market. Here, i indexes countries, and t indexes year; 
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧and ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ denote countries' creditor protection and shareholder protection, respectively; ܺ௜,௧ represents a series of control 
variables, which include a series of macroeconomic variables; ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ represent country and year fixed effects; ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, which captures 
unobservable shocks that affect bond and stock market development. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at 99%, 95% 
and 90% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creditor rights 0.27** 0.22* 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.23** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.20* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Revised ADR -0.54***    -0.58***    
 (0.17)    (0.17)    
Corrected ADR  -0.28***    -0.22**   
  (0.10)    (0.10)   
Anti-self-dealing   -2.74***    -2.74***  
   (0.75)    (0.76)  
Antitakeover    -0.92    -0.65 
    (0.98)    (0.98) 
GDP     -0.27** -0.12 -0.23** -0.23* 
     (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) 
GDP per capita     0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.00 
     (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) 
Inflation     -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 2.86*** 2.07*** 2.25*** 1.33*** 9.99*** 5.92*** 8.58*** 7.42***
 (0.61) (0.47) (0.40) (0.55) (2.34) (2.67) (2.28) (2.66) 
Country dummy No No No No No No No No 
Obs. 794 720 794 653 794 720 794 653 
R2 0.1804 0.0699 0.2354 0.0127 0.1563 0.0351 0.1739 0.0291 
 
  
Table 4  
Creditor rights, shareholder rights, legal origins, bond covenant and bond market vs. stock market development 
This table reports results for the regression ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌. ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.ൗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧.  The dependent variable is the relative capitalization of bond market to stock market. Here, i indexes countries, and t indexes year; 
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧and ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ denote for countries' creditor protection and shareholder protection, respectively; ௜ܺ,௧ represents a series of control 
variables, which include legal origins, restrictive bond covenants, information disclosure and debt contract enforcement and also a series of macroeconomic 
variables; ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ represent country and year fixed effects; ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, which captures unobservable shocks that affect bond and stock market 
development. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creditor rights 0.24** 0.27** 0.24** 0.25** 0.25* 0.27** 0.25* 0.26* 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Revised ADR -0.42**    -0.45*    
 (0.21)    (0.24)    
Corrected ADR  -0.23**    -0.20*   
  (0.10)    (0.12)   
Anti-self-dealing   -2.39*    -1.39  
   (1.27)    (1.49)  
Antitakeover    2.05    0.88 
    (1.37)    (1.77) 
GDP -0.25** -0.05 -0.23* -0.16 -0.21 -0.12 -0.24 -0.15 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) 
GDP per capita 0.00 -0.16 -0.03 -0.14 -0.12 -0.19 -0.10 -0.21 
 (0.14) (.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Inflation -0.00 -0.00 -000 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
English origin -0.71 -1.44** -0.12 -1.24 -0.51 -1.15 -0.46 -1.07 
 (0.71) (0.68) (0.84) (0.90) (0.80) (0.76) (0.97) (1.02) 
French origin -0.16 -0.30 -0.15 0.70 0.27 0.18 0.29 0.75 
 (0.68) (0.66) (0.69) (0.85) (0.74) (0.73) (0.77) (0.94) 
German origin 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.51 -0.20 0.02 0.08 0.28 
 (0.70) (0.75) (0.71) (0.86) (0.78) (0.83) (0.79) (0.96) 
Restrictive bond covenant     -0.23** -0.18 -0.16 -0.10 
     (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Constant 9.29*** 5.26** 8.52*** 5.00* 10.19*** 7.62** 9.45*** 6.53* 
 (2.43) (2.59) (2.37) (2.88) (2.78) (3.09) (2.82) (3.41) 
Country dummy No No No No No No No No 
Obs. 772 698 772 631 657 598 657 560 
R2 0.1931 0.1953 0.1806 0.0889 0.2783 0.2389 0.2194 0.0894
 
 
  
Table 5 
Creditor rights, shareholder rights, legal origins, bond covenant and bond market vs. stock market development  
This table reports results for the regression ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌. ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.ൗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧.  The dependent variable is the relative capitalization of bond market to stock market. Here, i indexes countries, and t indexes year; 
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧and ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ denote countries' creditor protection and shareholder protection, respectively; ܺ௜,௧ represents a series of control 
variables, which include legal origins, restrictive bond covenants, information disclosure and debt contract enforcement and also a series of macroeconomic 
variables; ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ represent country and year fixed effects; ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, which captures unobservable shocks that affect bond and stock market 
development. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creditor rights 0.27** 0.27** 0.28* 0.30** 0.29** 0.30** 0.31** 0.37*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) 
Revised ADR -0.65**    -0.58**    
 (0.28)    (0.27)    
Corrected ADR  -0.25**    -0.24**   
  (0.12)    (0.12)   
Anti-self-dealing   -0.90    -0.76  
   (1.40) 2.80**   (1.32)  
Antitakeover    (1.22)    3.50*** 
        (1.06) 
GDP -0.11 -0.20 -0.29* -0.24* -0.14 -0.23 -0.32** -0.25** 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) 
GDP per capita -0.20 -0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.13 0.05 0.10 0.11 
 (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) 
Inflation -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
English origin -0.59 -1.00* -0.58 -1.67** -0.66 -1.07* -0.73 -1.64***
 (0.65) (0.61) (0.87) (0.66) (0.62) (0.59) (0.83) (0.54) 
French origin -0.44 -0.11 0.05 0.15 -0.38 -0.09 0.07 0.64 
 (0.68) (0.63) (0.65) (0.61) (0.64) (0.61) (0.61) (0.53) 
German origin -0.45 -0.40 -0.31 -0.66 -0.36 -0.26 -0.14 0.18 
 (0.72) (0.69) (0.72) (0.71) (0.69) (0.68) (0.68) (0.65) 
Restrictive bond covenant -0.22** -0.22** -0.21** -0.24** -0.21** -0.20** -0.19** -0.12 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Information disclosure -0.04 -0.06* -0.05* -0.11*** -0.04 -0.05* -0.04 -0.08***
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.25) (0.03) 
Days of enforcement     0.14 0.24 0.30 0.58*** 
     (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.18) 
Cons 12.09*** 12.27*** 13.41*** 14.52*** 11.17*** 10.66*** 11.26*** 7.56* 
 (3.83) (3.72) (3.89) (3.74) (3.95) (3.94) (4.05) (3.69) 
Country dummy No No No No No No No No 
Obs. 576 576 576 494 576 576 576 494 
R2 0.397 0.406 0.324 0.454 0.416 0.430 0.365 0.543 
 
  
Table 6  
Effects of financial reform on bond vs. stock market development 
This table reports results for the regression ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌. ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.ൗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߪ ∙ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݁݀௜,௧ ∙ ܲ݋ݏݐ_ݎ݂݁݋ݎ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧.  The dependent variable is the relative capitalization of bond market to stock market. Here, i indexes countries and t 
indexes year; ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧and ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ denote countries' creditor protection and shareholder protection, respectively; ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݁݀௜,௧ =1 if the 
unit is in treated group and equals zero otherwise; ܲ݋ݏݐ_ݎ݂݁݋ݎ݉௜,௧ =1 if year t is the next year after financial reform and equals zero otherwise.  ௜ܺ,௧ represents a 
series of control variables, which include the interactions between creditor protection or shareholder protection and the post-reform dummy and also a series of 
macroeconomic variables; ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ represent country and year fixed effects; ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, which captures unobservable shocks that affect bond and stock 
market development. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Creditor 
i ht
0.27** 0.28* 0.32*** 0.27* 0.30*** 0.28* 0.31** 0.26* 0.25** 0.32* 0.28** 0.28* 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16) 
Revised ADR -0.53***  -0.75***          
 (0.17)  (0.19)          
Anti-self-
dealing
    -2.71***  -2.69***      
     (0.71)  (0.79)      
Corrected 
ADR 
        -0.53
*** -0.37** -0.57*** -0.44** 
         (0.14) (0.19) (0.15) (0.21) 
Treated*Post 
reform 0.74*** 0.72*** 1.05*** 0.96*** 0.79*** 0.72*** 1.09*** 0.96*** 1.07*** 0.94*** 1.15*** 0.99*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.29) (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.29) (0.23) (0.23) (0.29) (0.29) 
Information 
disclosure * 
Post reform
  0.003*  
0.003* 
   
0.003* 
 
0.003* 
   
0.003* 
 
0.003* 
 
   (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Cons. 11.54*** 20.13*** 10.61*** 22.07*** 10.06*** 20.13*** 10.09*** 22.07*** 8.97*** 20.72*** 9.04*** 21.41*** 
 (2.71) (3.49) (2.98) (4.22) (2.57) (3.49) (3.00) (4.22) (2.80) (3.90) (2.93) (4.21) 
Macro 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 564 564 470 470 564 564 470 470 517 517 470 470 
R2 0.084 0.030 0.275 0.012 0.130 0.030 0.169 0.012 0.073 0.003 0.123 0.001 
 
 Table 7  
Financial reform, creditor rights, shareholder rights and bond market vs. stock market 
development 
This table reports results for the regression ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌. ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.ൗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛ ∙
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧.  The dependent variable is the relative 
capitalization of bond market to stock market. Here, i indexes countries, and t indexes year; 
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧and ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ denote countries' creditor protection and shareholder protection, 
respectively; ௜ܺ,௧ represents a series of control variables, which include the interactions between creditor 
protection or shareholder protection and the post-reform dummy and also a series of macroeconomic variables; 
ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ represent country and year fixed effects; ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, which captures unobservable shocks that 
affect bond and stock market development. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply 
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.26** 0.23* 0.25** 0.23* 0.26** 0.31* 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) 
Revised ADR -0.57***      
 (0.17)      
Anti-self-dealing   -2.57
***    
   (0.71)    
Corrected ADR     -0.51*** -0.33* 
     (0.15) (0.18) 
Creditor rights * post 
reform 
0.17** 
 
0.30*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.14* 
 
0.15* 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Revised ADR * post 
reform 
-0.03 
 
-0.81** 
     
 (0.05) (0.34)     
Anti-self-dealing * post 
reform   
-0.81** 
 
-0.81** 
   
   (0.35) (0.34)   
Corrected ADR * post 
reform     
0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
     (0.05) (0.05) 
Cons. 11.41*** 19.95*** 9.49*** 19.95*** 10.13*** 20.41***
 (2.74) (3.49) (2.56) (3.49) (3.00) (3.96) 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 564 564 564 564 517 517 
R2 0.080 0.031 0.117 0.031 0.021 0.011 
 
  
Table 8 
Financial reform, information disclosure, creditor rights, shareholder rights and bond market 
vs. stock market development 
This table reports results for the regression ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌. ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.ൗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛ ∙
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧.  The dependent variable is the relative 
capitalization of bond market to stock market. Here, i indexes countries, and t indexes year; ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ 
and ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ denote for countries' creditor protection and shareholder protection, respectively; ௜ܺ,௧ 
represents a series of control variables, which include the interactions among information sharing, creditor 
protection or shareholder protection and the post-reform dummy and also a series of macroeconomic variables; 
ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ represent country and year fixed effects; ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, which captures unobservable shocks that 
affect bond and stock market development. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply 
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.32** 0.27* 0.29** 0.27* 0.31** 0.30* 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) 
Revised ADR -0.81***      
 (0.19)      
Anti-self-dealing   -2.79***    
   (0.87)    
Corrected ADR     -0.55*** -0.40* 
     (0.16) (0.21) 
Information disclosure * 
Creditor rights * post 
reform 
0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.001* 0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Information disclosure * 
Revised ADR* post reform  
-0.001 
 
 
-0.001 
 
 
    
 (0.001) (0.001)     
Information disclosure * 
anti-self-dealing * post 
reform  
  -0.012** -0.001   
   (0.006) (0.001)   
Information disclosure * 
Corrected ADR* post 
reform   
    0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Cons. 11.12*** 22.64*** 11.53*** 22.64*** 11.26*** 21.86***
 (3.05) (4.26) (3.15) (4.26) (3.16) (4.28) 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 470 470 470 470 470 470 
R2 0.233 0.024 0.107 0.024 0.028 0.002 
 
  
Table 9 
Banking crises, creditor rights, shareholder rights and bond market vs. stock market 
development 
This table reports results for the regression ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌. ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.ൗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߪ ∙
ܤܽ݊݇݅݊݃	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜,௧ 	൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧. The dependent 
variable is the relative capitalization of bond market to stock market. Here, i indexes countries, and t indexes 
year; ܤܽ݊݇݅݊݃	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜,௧	is a dummy standing for banking crises; ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ and ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ 
denote countries' creditor protection and shareholder protection, respectively; ௜ܺ,௧ represents a series of control 
variables, which include the interactions between legal variables and banking crisis and the macroeconomic 
variables; ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ represent country and year fixed effects; ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, which captures unobservable 
shocks that affect bond and stock market development. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
imply significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights index 0.27** 0.26** 0.27** 0.28** 0.27** 0.27* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Revised anti-director 
index 
-0.47** -0.45**     
 (0.20) (0.19)     
Anti-self-dealing   -2.07** -2.15**   
   (0.96) (0.96)   
Corrected ADR     -0.22** -0.26** 
     (0.11) (0.11) 
Banking crisis 0.52*** 1.05** 0.51*** 0.42* 0.55*** 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.41) (0.10) (0.24) (0.11) (0.49) 
Creditor rights * 
Banking crisis 
 0.01  -0.06  0.00 
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Revised ADR *  
Banking crisis  -0.15     
  (0.11)     
Anti-self-dealing * 
Banking crisis    0.42   
    (0.49)   
Corrected ADR * 
Banking crisis 
     0.14  
      (0.12) 
Cons. 10.25*** 10.51*** 9.30*** 9.16*** 8.29*** 7.85*** 
 (2.16) (2.18) (2.08) (2.08) (2.38) (2.33) 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No No No No Yes Yes 
Obs. 663 663 663 663 589 589 
R2 0.114 0.110 0.098 0.105 0.037 0.054 
 
  
Table 10 Banking crises and bond vs. stock market development: Advanced economies vs. 
Emerging economies 
This table reports results for the regression  ܤ݋݊݀	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌. ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌.ൗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߪ ∙
ܴ݁݃݅݋݊	݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ∙ ܤܽ݊݇݅݊݃	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜,௧ 	൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧. 
The dependent variable is the relative capitalization of the bond market to stock market. Here, i indexes 
countries, and t indexes year; ܤܽ݊݇݅݊݃	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜,௧	is a dummy standing for banking crises; ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ and 
݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ denote countries' creditor protection and shareholder protection, respectively; ௜ܺ,௧ 
represents a series of control variables, which include the interactions between legal variables and banking crisis 
and the macroeconomic variables; ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ represent country and year fixed effects; ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, which 
captures unobservable shocks that affect bond and stock market development. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. 
 
  Advanced East Asian Latin American 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor Rights 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.28** 0.30** 0.42*** 0.41*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Revised ADR -0.48  -0.38*  -0.50**  
 (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.19)  
Anti-self-dealing  -2.13**  -1.74*  -2.23** 
  (1.00)  (0.95)  (1.01) 
Advanced *  
Banking crisis 
0.85*** 0.85***     
 (0.31) (0.30)     
East Asia * Banking crisis   -0.96 -1.01*   
   (0.60) (0.57)   
Latin America *  
Banking crisis 
    -0.44 -0.27 
     (0.53) (0.38) 
Creditor rights *  
Banking crisis 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.24) (0.18) 
Revised ADR *   
Banking crisis 
-0.00  0.10  -0.13  
 (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.13)  
Anti-self-dealing * 
Banking crisis  -0.50  0.93*  0.76 
  (0.62)  (0.48)  (0.71) 
Cons. 8.95*** 8.11** 10.12*** 9.24*** 8.72*** 7.97** 
 (3.27) (3.23) (2.16) (2.06) (3.29) (3.25) 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No No No No No No 
Obs. 448 448 663 663 448 448 
R2 0.113 0.079 0.170 0.170 0.109 0.074 
 
 
  
Figure 1 
Plot of relative capitalization of bond market to stock market during systemic banking crises 
(1970-2011) 
The Y-axis represents the average ratio of bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization; the X-axis 
represents the year before, during and after banking crises. We assume that banking crises occur at year 0, thus, 
year=-2 represents two years before banking crises and so forth. The crisis period is covered by the shadow 
boxes. The advanced economies stand for the economies with GDP per capita over 10,000 USD; the East Asian 
economies include seven economies that experienced severe crises from 1997-98; the Latin American economies 
include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 
Table A.1  Creditor rights, shareholder rights, legal origins, bond covenant and private bond vs. stock 
market development  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights index 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Revised anti-director  
index 
-0.19** 
   
-0.26** 
   
 (0.09)   (0.13)   
Anti-self-dealing  -1.22***   -1.25**  
  (0.38)   (0.53)  
Corrected ADR   -0.05   -0.07 
   (0.05)   (0.06) 
Bond covenant    -0.11* -0.09 -0.12** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Information disclosure     -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Days of contract 
enforcement 
   -0.02  
0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
    (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Constant 0.61* 0.51** 0.18 1.94 0.94 1.80 
 (0.31) (0.21) (0.24) (2.02) (2.04) (2.03) 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy No No No No No No 
Obs. 794 794 720 576 576 576 
R2 0.062 0.128 0.033 0.230 0.311 0.241 
 
 
 
